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Punishment, Property, and the Limits of Altruism:
Locke’s International Asymmetry
ALEX TUCKNESS Iowa State University
T he standard interpretation of Locke assumes symmetry between punishment by individuals inthe state of nature and punishment by states in the state of nature. The standard interpretationis incorrect because in cases where the punishment is altruistic, the state is not the functional
equivalent of a person, having a more restricted power to punish. The asymmetry arises from Locke’s
contractualism because individuals in the state of nature might reasonably refuse to give governments the
power to punish altruistically. This interpretation clarifies some ongoing puzzles about Locke’s theory
of property where questions about coerced sacrifices to benefit others also arise. Locke’s argument is
vulnerable to important objections, specifically that he equivocates on the meaning of the word “body,”
that he places too much emphasis on the right of self-preservation, and that he legitimates nearly unlimited
appropriation by states.
W hen a state attempts to punish acts commit-ted in foreign territory by noncitizens, criticsmayquestionwhether suchactions violate the
sovereignty of the state in whose territory the offense
occurs or whether the rights of the accused have been
violated in some way. Both criticisms can also be asked
in a modified form when states work together through
an international organization, such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC), to punish offenders in analo-
gous cases. This article examines a third way in which
the question of legitimacy arises that has receivedmuch
less attention: whether international punishment is in
some cases illegitimate because of the sacrifices it im-
poses on the people who bring it about. It normally
costs the state or states that are trying to punish crimes
against humanity or war crimes both lives and treasure
to do so. The third question is thus whether it is ille-
gitimate for states to require such sacrifices from their
own citizens. What is at stake is whether states have
the same moral permissions to act as individuals do.
John Locke’s influential political theory will provide
the setting for exploring this question. The standard in-
terpretation of Locke takes him to provide strong sup-
port for international punishment because he would
affirm that states may punish violations of natural law
wherever they occur. This article argues that in cases
where international punishment is altruistic in nature,
the weight of Locke’s texts point toward such interven-
tions being illegitimate.1
Alex Tuckness is Associate Professor, Department of Political Sci-
ence, Iowa State University, 503 Ross Hall, Ames, IA 50011 (tuck-
ness@iastate.edu).
While a Faculty Fellow in Ethics at Harvard University’s Center
for Ethics and the Professions, I was encouraged to take a paper I
presented on the ethics of humanitarian intervention that drew upon
Locke and to explore its historical aspect more deeply. This article
represents the long culmination of that process. I would also like to
thank John Michael Parrish, Anastasia Tuckness, Anne Wiltgen, my
colleagues and students at Iowa State, and the APSR referees and
editors for their comments, criticisms, and editorial suggestions.
1 Allen Buchanan (1999) has advanced a similar interpretation of
Locke, but the discussion is less than a paragraph and does not
provide any argument to show why the standard interpretation is
wrong. This article will thus seek to vindicate Buchanan’s reading
The specific issue is collective altruism as it relates
to international punishment. Collective altruism here
means, unless otherwise indicated, cases where a state
(acting alone or in coordination with an international
body such as the ICC) uses its coercive power to coor-
dinate the actions of its citizens in a way that benefits
noncitizens abroad but is not expected to create mate-
rial net benefits for the citizens themselves. To say that
an action is altruistic in this sense is not to prejudge the
question of whether it is morally obligatory because
the question of when altruistic acts are obligatory will
be important in what follows.2 Instances of collective
altruism would include nonpunishment cases, such as
using money raised through taxes to provide food for
the poor in other countries, and punishment cases, such
as ordering military personnel to defend victims of hu-
man rights abuses, overthrow oppressive regimes, or
arrest the perpetrators of crimes (assuming, in both
types of cases, that the altruistic country does not ma-
terially benefit). “Punish” is thus being used broadly.
It refers to uses of force that are justified by the fact
that a person or group has violated the rights of others,
and so it includes intervention into ongoing crises to
stop the violations as well as taking the necessary steps
after a violation has occurred to bring the perpetrators
to justice. “International” limits us to cases where the
persons to be punished are not citizens of the punishing
state, and the violations did not occur in the punishing
state’s territory.
This claim about international punishment raises the
question of whether Locke’s view of the state bars it
from pursuing altruistic policies altogether. The ques-
tion of how much power a state has to compel indi-
viduals to give up their property for purposes that do
not benefit them has long been a vexed area in Locke
of Locke, but it will also question the ease with which he dismisses
Locke’s approach. A closer study of Locke’s reasons for holding this
position presents a stronger justification for his position, albeit one
that is still problematic.
2 This article does not consider cases where a state might have a
duty to help individuals in other states because it has violated their
rights and owes them reparations, except for a brief discussion in the
conclusion.
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scholarship. The explanation of the asymmetry thesis
given as follows both makes sense of many of Locke’s
statements about international punishment and also
sheds light on some ongoing disputes about the limits
on the state’s ability to regulate property in Locke’s
theory by showing us the sense that Locke was, and
was not, what we would now call a “libertarian.”
Section One frames the discussion within Locke’s
historical context to show both that Locke had the rel-
evant concepts available to him and that there are rea-
sons to think he was interested in the issues of altruism
and international punishment. Section Two explains
the arguments for the standard interpretation of Locke
on international punishment. SectionThree argues that
for issues of international punishment, there is anasym-
metry inLocke’s thought that stems fromhis contractu-
alism. Briefly, Locke held that in the state of nature, the
right of self-preservation gives individuals the right to
refuse to punish others because this normally puts the
punisher’s life at risk. One of the terms of the contract
when individuals choose to leave the state of nature
is that the state may compel citizens to use both their
lives and property for the defense of the state. Without
such a commitment, the inconveniences of the state of
nature would remain. Individuals in the state of nature
do retain the right to refuse to punish in cases where
the punishment is altruistic. Section Four then takes up
the implications of this contractualist explanation for
Locke’s understanding of property rights and argues
that Locke was at best a lax libertarian because he
both affirmed enforceable charity rights and did not
require that government policies be narrowly tailored
to the protection of rights. The contractualist interna-
tional asymmetry account in SectionThree can account
for both Locke’s libertarian sounding passages about
the purposes for which governments can act and the
broad latitude Locke gives them for choosing means
to pursue those purposes. The conclusion evaluates the
significance of Locke’s argument and raises some im-
portant objections to it.
SECTION ONE: INTERNATIONAL
PUNISHMENT AND ALTRUISM IN CONTEXT
The term “altruism” is used because in contemporary
language it is the most usual way to describe actions
that are costly to those who perform them and that are
intended to benefit others. It is not an altogether satis-
factory term because it was coined by Auguste Comte
more than a century after Locke’s death in part as
a reaction against Christian understandings of charity
that Comte found too individualistic (Scott and Seglow
2007, 1–2, 14–18). Because Locke’s theology empha-
sized the need for individual rewards and punishments
in the next life to motivate actions to benefit others
(E, 2.28.5–8),3 Comte would have rejected Locke’s
3 References to Locke’s primary works are given as follows: E= Es-
say Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1979) by book, chap-
ter, and section number; L = Letter Concerning Toleration (Locke
1983) by page number; PE = Political Essays (Locke 1997) by page
number; STCE = Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Locke
view and vice versa. The term “altruism” is nonetheless
used here because in contemporary usage, it is themost
economical way to describe actions that benefit others
at a cost to oneself. As used in this article, the word
does not carry Comte’s specific understanding and can
be used to describe sacrificial actions an individual per-
forms in order to obtain rewards or avoid punishments
in the next life.
There is, however, a deeper issue about anachronism
that cannot be dealt with simply by definitional fiat. It
is only permissible to use “altruism” as a convenient
way to reference the set of cases under consideration
if the term actually tracks concepts and arguments that
Locke could actually have had in mind. At the very
least, the implications from Locke’s principles should
be ones Locke would have agreed flowed from them.
Moreover, if Locke did not have debates about the lim-
its of self-sacrifice and the legitimacy of international
punishment in mind when he was writing the Second
Treatise and related works, his statements that seem
to go against the right of states to engage in altruis-
tic international punishment might simply reflect an
oversight rather than an actual argument against such
punishment.
The concepts of altruism and international pun-
ishment track several different seventeenth-century
debates in which Locke was both familiar and inter-
ested. The first debate framed duties of military ser-
vice against a background right of individuals to seek
their own preservation. Hobbes saw the desire for self-
preservation as both so strong and so obviously justi-
fied that any obligation that forced an individual to act
against this desire became suspect. Hobbes was vexed
by this issue and, in arguably ad hoc fashion, declared
in the conclusion toLeviathan that “every man is bound
by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in War, the
Authority, by which he himself is protected in time of
Peace” (1991, 484). Given how reluctant Hobbes was
to make even this concession regarding the individual
right of self-preservation, this proviso would not seem
broad enough to condemn a man who ran away when
asked to fight in a war that would not protect his own
state at all, but would only help distant strangers. Re-
sponding toHobbes,RichardCumberland claimed that
the right to preserve oneself derived from the fact that
we can only serve the common good if we are alive and
that, therefore, “if Religion, or the public Welfare of
Men, requires it, we be ready to part with the last drop
of our Blood” (2005, 324). The advantages we receive
from living in society are so great that we should, on
those rare occasions where it is necessary, repay society
with our very lives (2005, 601–2; Kirk 1987, 34).
Locke’s contemporary, Samuel Pufendorf, clearly
had available the relevant concept of self-sacrifice. Like
Cumberland, he held that we have positive duties to
help others in addition to duties to refrain from harm,
1996) by section number; TT= Two Treatises of Government (Locke
1988) cited by treatise and section number; and W = Works (Locke
1963) by volume and page number. The original formatting, spacing,
and punctuation are retained in quotations unless otherwise noted,
but spellings have been modernized.
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but in contrast to Cumberland he emphasized the as-
sistance we can provide “without loss, trouble, or labor
on our part” (Pufendorf 1934, 350). He later discussed
cases where a person acts to benefit someone else at
cost to himself. Such actions were not described by
Pufendorf as obligatory, but they could create obliga-
tions of gratitude for the recipient.4 His comments here
also relate to a second debate, to be discussed more
fully in Section Four, regarding whether giving help to
the poor could be compelled by the state.
Pufendorf was also part of a third debate in the
seventeenth century that framed the right to war
within the context of international punishment. One of
Pufendorf’s main points of disagreement with Grotius
was over the permissibility of states punishing wrongs
done to third parties. Grotius included the altruistic
category “the Good of the Offender” as one of the
three reasons to punish (2005, 963–65), but required
that the one punished be guilty of some fault. He listed
certain violations of natural law, such as inhumanity to-
ward parents and eating human flesh, as ground for war
(2005, 1021–25). Pufendorf disagreed (1934, 1297) and
argued that for a man to wage war on behalf of others,
the side for which he fights must have been wronged
and “there should lie a special obligation, whereby he
is bound to the principal belligerent” (1934, 1305). The
strongest obligation is when one’s citizens are attacked,
followed by those states one has promised by treaty to
defend, and then those states that are “friends” or that
have put us in their debt by some bestowed benefit.
Pufendorf notes that this may happen because it is of-
ten in the interest both of the intervening country, as
well as humanity in general, to punish rogue states. He
then concludes, “Yet there ought to be some restraint in
this, so that not every man, even though he live in nat-
ural liberty, should have the right to coerce and punish
by war any person who has done any other person an
injury, on the sole excuse that the public good demands
that injuries to the innocent should not go unpunished,
and that what concerns one should concern all” (1934,
1307). He therefore limited intervention to those cases
where the injured party has called for aid (1934, 1307).
Richard Tuck argues that there is no doubt about
the extent of Locke’s interest in international affairs.
He suggests that Locke was writing the Second Trea-
tise in 1681 while he was reading Pufendorf’s De Jure
Naturae et Gentium (see also Marshall 1994, 203), and
that although Locke follows Pufendorf in several im-
portant respects, one of Locke’s main goals in the Sec-
ond Treatise was to refute some of Pufendorf’s views
on property and international punishment that would
have impeded European colonial practices (Tuck 1999,
167–76). We thus have reason to believe that the legiti-
macy of international punishment was a major concern
for Locke at the time he wrote the Second Treatise. The
4 He writes that it is particularly praiseworthy when a man “of his
own good will and bent, from his own generosity, or from pity for
another man’s condition does something for him without return, at
considerable cost or labor to himself, whereby the other is aided in
his difficulties, or else some considerable advantage is rendered him”
(1934, 373).
asymmetry thesis advanced here does not conflict with
the main thrust of Tuck’s argument (advanced also by
Tully 1993 and Arneil 1996) that Locke was seeking to
justify English colonial policies. Because Locke’s argu-
ment only prevents states from engaging in altruistic
punishment, it does not preclude international punish-
ment for reasons of state.
Turning to the fourth debate, seventeenth-century
writers sometimes used Christian charity as a frame
for acts of political violence. Gentili, when identifying
just causes of offensivewars, described “honorable rea-
sons” as when we go to war “for no private reason of
our own, but for the common interest and on behalf
of others” (1933, 122). It is honorable when one has
“incurred enmities, encountered danger, and con-
tributed aid, interest, and labor.”AlthoughGentili also
talks about such actions as punishment, it is clear that
the justifying motive is not seeing that due punishment
is received but instead doing good to others at cost to
oneself. It is telling that war was one of the general top-
ics to be covered under the subject of charity according
to Suarez (1944).
One important strain of this charity argument was
specifically religious. The dominant strand of argument
for religious persecution in Restoration England was
inspired by Augustine’s argument that “when the sav-
ing gifts of the Catholic Church are in question, then
coercive discipline is charity” (Goldie 1991, 337). The
good of brining others to faith tended to be used more
indirectly in international cases where it was a matter
of fighting those who had never accepted Christianity,
and most writers stopped short of saying failure to em-
brace Christianity was itself a cause of war.5 That so
many writers felt compelled to address this question
indicates that it was a serious topic. A good example of
the indirect international charity argument is provided
by Suarez who claimed that force could be used to
ensure that missionaries could go to other countries
to teach people to obey God and the law of nature
(1944, 827). Here, Suarez does not make the claim that
force can directly convert people and the reason for
war can be framed as alleviating harms to those who
want to hear but cannot. The underlying justification,
however, is ultimately that instruction in true religion
is very beneficial and force can be used to ensure that
people receive it.
The preceding discussion shows us first that Locke
had available the relevant concepts to formulate a
theory that rules out cases of altruistic international
punishment. It also gives us reason to think Locke
was interested in questions of the limits of coerced
self-sacrifice, the legitimacy of international punish-
ment, and altruistic justifications for the use of force
internationally. What is distinctive about Locke, on the
account developed here, is that previous thinkers who
opposedwar for altruistic reasons focusedon thewrong
done to other nations, whereas Locke focused more on
the lack of authority the state had to carry out such
actions.
5 See also Vitoria 1991, 265–75, 284–87; Grotius 2005, 1041–52;
Pufendorf 2002, 12–13; and Tuck 1999, 160.
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SECTION TWO: THE STANDARD
INTERPRETATION
The standard interpretation of Locke’s theory of inter-
national relations takes it to be parallel to his account
of individuals in the state of nature.6 In Locke’s state
of nature, people are free, equal, and independent (TT,
2.4, 95), and they are governed by the law of nature,
which Locke also refers to as the law of reason (TT,
2.16, 30, 56, 57, 90). The law of nature teaches people
that no one may harm another in his7 life, liberty, and
property and that there is a positive obligation to pre-
serve the lives of others where one’s own preservation
is not threatened (TT, 2.6). Locke frequently refers to
the principle that, as much as possible, mankind is to be
preserved as the fundamental law of nature (TT, 2.7,
16, 134, 135, 149, 159, 171, 183; Simmons 1992, 46–50).
Many interpreters take Locke’s statement in the First
Treatise that charity gives those in danger of starving
to death a “title” to the surplus production of others
(TT, 1.42) as a practical application of this obligation
to preserve others when our own preservation is not
threatened. Charity is discussed more fully in Section
Four. According to the standard interpretation, Locke
knew that there would be violations of the law of na-
ture and that this raised the question of whether (and
how) violations might be punished. One of the most
important arguments in Locke’s Second Treatise is the
claim that all people, not just victims of an attack, have
the right to punish violations of the law of nature (TT,
2.7–13). One distinctive feature of Locke’s thought is
the egalitarian distribution of this power of punishing
in the state of nature and the subsequent burdens of
judgment that it creates (McClure 1996, 131, 149–50).
Oneof the judgments individualsmustmake iswhether
to pursue altruistic punishment.
The label “altruistic” distinguishes the previous case
from cases where a third party punishes another indi-
vidual for violating the rights of another and intends
to benefit in some way. One might believe, for exam-
ple, that punishing someone who has attacked a third
party is to one’s own advantage because the attacker
is a threat or because the punishment will deter others
from doing the same. One of Locke’s themes is that a
person who has violated the law of nature “hath by the
unjustViolence and Slaughter he hath committed upon
one, declared War against all Mankind, and therefore
maybe destroyed. . .” (TT, 2.11).Altruistic punishment
remains a possibility, however, because any given crim-
inal is not equally dangerous to every person. Themore
remote the danger a criminal poses to any particular
individual, the more “altruistic” is the decision of that
6 Examples include Arneil 1996, 62–3; Dunn 1994; Nozick 1974, 137;
Parry 1978, 133; Schiller 1972, 418–19; Scott 2000, 551; Seliger 1968,
111–13; Simmons 1992, 165 n7; Tuck 1999, 177; and Ward 2006, 703–
4. I myself held the standard view until quite recently. See Tuckness
2006, 145–46.
7 Masculine pronouns are used so as not to prejudge the question of
how the historical Locke would have seen these arguments as apply-
ing to women. Philosophically, there is no reason why the arguments
would not apply equally to women.
individual to punish the offender for the sake of the
rest of humanity.
When Locke takes up the objection that the state
of nature is mere fiction, he provides textual support
for the standard interpretation’s claim of symmetry
between the rights and obligations of individuals in
the state of nature and the rights and obligations of
independent governments. He writes
Tis often asked as a mighty Objection, Where are, or ever
were, there any Men in such a State of Nature? To which it
may suffice as an answer at present; That since all Princes
and Rulers of Independent Governments all through the
World, are in a State of Nature, ’tis plain the World never
was, nor ever will be, without Numbers of Men in that
State. (TT, 2.14)
Locke here follows Grotius (2005) and Hobbes (1991)
in seeing the relationship between individual persons
who have no common sovereign as analogous to the
situation of international relations.8 The implication of
this statement is that the same permissions and obliga-
tions that apply to individuals in the state of nature also
apply to states. If one state sees another state violating
the law of nature, for example, by waging a war of
aggression to take away another state’s justly acquired
territory, it could altruistically intervene on behalf of
the attacked party to help it ward off the attack and
punish the attacking state, even if doing so was not in
its own interests.
There are several passages that support this stan-
dard interpretation. In situations where the father of a
household functions as its political leader, he has the
authority to punish all violations of the law of nature,
including violations by those who are not members of
his family (TT, 2.105). Inhis discussionof the federative
power, Locke explicitly makes the connection between
the state of nature and international relations.9 The
federative power includes the power of war and peace,
of entering into treaties with both commonwealths and
individuals who are not part of any commonwealth
(TT, 2.145–46). He claims that because the common-
wealth is, with respect to others, considered to be “one
body,”10 it has the power to execute the law of nature
with respect the rest of mankind. All of this, according
to the standard interpretation, implies wide freedom
for states to intervene, although how clearly this is
spelled out varies from interpreter to interpreter.
8 See also TT, 2.183.
9 Locke writes, “There is another Power in every Commonwealth,
which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the
Power every Man naturally had before he entered into Society. For
though in a Commonwealth the Members of it are distinct Persons
still in reference to one another, and as such are governed by the
Laws of the Society; yet in reference to the rest of Mankind, they
make one Body, which is, as every Member of it before was, still
in the State of Nature with the rest of Mankind. Hence it is, that
the Controversies that happen between any Man of the Society with
those that are out of it, aremanaged by the public; and an injury done
to aMember of their Body, engages the whole in the reparation of it.
So that under this Consideration, the whole Community is one Body
in the State of Nature, in respect of all other States or Persons out of
its Community” (TT, 2.145).
10 See also TT, 2.135.
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This permission is widened even further because
Locke’s theory permits preemptive attacks on those
who threaten to violate one’s rights. In discussing war
between individual persons, Locke writes that “declar-
ing by Word or Action, not a passionate and hasty, but
a sedate settled Design, upon another Man’s Life, puts
him in a State of War with him against whom he has
declared such an Intention, and so has exposed his Life
to the other’s Power to be taken away by him, or any
one that joins with him in his Defense, and espouses
his Quarrel” (TT, 2.16).11 Notice that these triggers for
the state of war (declarations by words or actions that
manifest a “settled design upon another man’s life”)
justify preemptive attacks not only by the threatened
party but also by “any one that joins with him in hisDe-
fense.” This doctrine opens the way for humanitarian
interventions when there is clear evidence of a “settled
design” of tyranny or handing the people over to a
foreign power. If a state sees clear evidence of impend-
ing violations of the right to life, liberty, or property,
it could invade to stop the violations from happening.
Locke is vague about the threshold for intervention,
but the lack of specification itself argues for a fairly
permissive set of ground rules.
The standard interpretation thus takes the situation
of states to be symmetric to that of individuals in the
state of nature and permits states to use the executive
power of the law of nature altruistically. Section Three
argues for an asymmetry between the condition of indi-
viduals in the state of nature and states in international
relations in terms of their freedom to pursue altruis-
tic policies. Although Locke does permit individuals
to engage in altruistic punishment, he does not allow
states to use their coercive power to do the same.
SECTION THREE: THE CONTRACTUALIST
ARGUMENT FOR THE ASYMMETRY THESIS
When Locke describes the powers of the common-
wealth in TT (2.88), he notes that it has two powers,
the power to pass and enforce laws domestically and
“the power to punish any Injury done unto any of its
Members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the
power of War and Peace;) and all this for the preserva-
tion of the property of all the Members of that Society,
as far as is possible.” This statement omits the power of
punishing injuries done to those who are not members
of the commonwealth and then specifies that the power
is to be used for the preservation of members of one’s
own society. Were this passage an isolated instance, we
might consider it nothing more than a slip; however,
this way of talking about the powers of the common-
wealth continually recurs. In the First Treatise, Locke
11 In the following sections, Locke extends the logic to include as-
saults on freedom and property. If anyone would try to put me under
his absolute power (TT, 2.17) or take my property (TT, 2.18), my
life is implicitly threatened. Locke thus includes taking of property
and attempts at gaining absolute power as legitimate causes of war.
Locke reiterates in TT (2.19) that a declared design on another is
sufficient to provoke war. Similarly, people must not wait until their
freedomhas been taken away to resist a government that is becoming
tyrannical (TT, 2.220).
states that governments exist to protect the property
rights of the governed (TT, 1.92). Locke writes that
people join particular political communities to receive
“greater Security against any that are not of it,” but
does not list more effective punishment of violations
committed against or within other communities as a
reason (TT, 2.95). Locke states that the government is
to employ the force of community “abroad to prevent
or redress Foreign Injuries, and secure the Community
from Inroads and Invasion. And all this to be directed
to no other end but the Peace, Safety, and public good
of the People” (TT, 2.131).12
When Locke goes into more detail about the feder-
ative power, he frames the issue in a similar way. As
noted previously, Locke describes the power ofwar and
peace as a power to punish injuries against members of
that commonwealth (TT, 2.88). When explaining why
the executive and federative powers are, for practical
purposes, entrusted to the same executive entity, Locke
describes the federative power as “the management of
the security and interest of the public without” (TT,
2.147). Even the passage quoted in support of the stan-
dard interpretation (TT, 2.145) focuses on redressing
injuries against one’s own citizens. Thus, although the
initial presentation of the federative power made it
seem strictly analogous to the situation of individuals
within the state of nature, Locke’s later presentations
indicate an asymmetry. Although individuals in the
state of nature have the right altruistically to punish
violations committed against others within the bounds
of natural law, the commonwealth may use its power of
punishing within the bounds of natural law only when
doing so is beneficial to the commonwealth itself.
The crucial shift that accounts for the asymmetry
occurs with respect to the relevant society of which
the individual is a member. TT (2.171) provides the
clearest explanation of this. Locke begins by stating
that the political power of the commonwealth derives
from thosepowers that individuals in the state of nature
had that were transferred to the commonwealth, to be
directed by the government. This is done with the
express or tacit Trust, That it shall be employed for their
good, and the preservation of their Property: Now this
Power, which every Man has in the State of Nature, and
which he parts with to the Society, in all such cases, where
the Society can secure him, is, to use such means for the
preserving of his own Property, as he thinks good, and
Nature allows him; and to punish the Breach of the Law of
Nature in others so, as (according to the best of hisReason)
may most conduce to the preservation of himself, and the
rest ofMankind. So that the end and measure of this Power,
when in every Man’s hands in the state of Nature, being
the preservation of all of his Society, that is, all Mankind in
general, it can have no other end or measure, when in the
hands of the Magistrate, but to preserve the Members of
that Society in their Lives, Liberties and Possessions. (TT,
2.171)13
12 See also TT, 2.110, 143, 163, and 227.
13 On the claim that in the state of nature mankind forms a single
community, see Ashcraft 1987, 107–9.
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Locke here claims that in the state of nature, one is a
member of the society of mankind and therefore may
punish on behalf of mankind, but that when one joins
a more limited political society the power to punish
is used only on behalf of that more limited society.
It is grammatically possible that “that Society” in the
last line refers to mankind in general, but the context
here and in the rest of the work strongly weighs in
favor of “that Society” referring to the political society
one has joined. Locke begins the section by explaining
that citizens give power to the government with the
condition that it be used for the protection of their
good and their property. A government that brought
about harm to its citizens or damaged their property
in the process of pursuing altruistic goals would not
be fulfilling this condition. The structure of the last
sentence implies the following logic: one may use the
power of punishment for the preservation of the society
of which one is a member; hence, in the state of nature,
one uses this power for the preservation of all mankind
(for that is one’s society in the state of nature) and, in
a state, for the preservation of that state.
It is significant that when Locke talks about us be-
coming members of a specific political community, he
talks about it as also separating from the general com-
munity rather than simply adding an additional set of
obligations (TT, 2.128). Thus, although Locke some-
times talks about the law of nature as the preservation
of all mankind, it is significant that in some cases when
Locke talks about the fundamental law of nature to
guide the legislature, he says it is “the preservation of the
Society” (TT, 2.134). In discussing prerogative, he says
that according to the “Fundamental Law ofNature and
Government,” as much as possible, “all the members
of the Society are to be preserved” (TT, 2.159), clearly
referring to the specific political community. To be sure,
Locke sometimes uses the more familiar formulation
when talking about the powers of government (TT,
2.135). The significance of Locke’s interchangeable use
of the two phrases is that he believed that a government
limited to pursuing the preservation of its own mem-
bers was furthering, not hindering, the preservation of
all mankind.
The thrust of these passages is that if a state were
to use its power to punish perpetrators of genocide in
a foreign country in a case where doing so was of no
net benefit to the lives, liberties, and properties of its
own citizens, it would act illegitimately. The punishing
state would not be guilty of wronging the perpetrators
of the genocide. Rather, the wrong would be against
the citizens of its own state by acting beyond its proper
authority. Governments are created to preserve the
property of their own citizens, not engage in altruistic
punishment.
There are two passages in the Two Treatises that
might be believed to undermine this interpretation.
Locke writes, “The first Power, viz. of doing what-
soever he thought fit for the Preservation of himself,
and the rest of Mankind, he gives up to be regulated
by Laws made by the Society” (TT, 2.129). Although
this might be taken as evidence that the power to act
for the good of mankind as a whole is transferred
to the state, the rest of the sentence reads “so far
forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of
that Society shall require.” It thus confirms that the
power once transferred is not to be used for altruistic
purposes.
In the second passage, Locke writes, “The end of
Government is the good of Mankind; and which is best
for Mankind, that the people should be always exposed
to the boundless will of Tyranny, or that the Rulers
should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they
grow exorbitant in the use of their Power, and employ
it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the
Properties of their People?” (TT, 2.229). One could
object that Locke here explicitly affirms that the end of
government is not the good of its own people, but that
ofmankind as awhole, and thatwhenLocke repeatedly
says that governments may only seek the good of their
own citizens, he is contrasting this with rule for the
ruler’s own good, not altruistic punishment. However,
the passage need not be interpreted in this way because
there is ambiguity as to whether Locke is referring to
the end of specific governments (each government is to
promote the good of mankind) or government as such
(governments are created tomakemankind better off).
The flow of the passage as a whole makes it difficult to
insist on the first interpretation.Nothing in it even hints
at altruistic obligations, and the main point seems to be
subjecting claims about the rights of governments and
subjects to the test “would recognition of the right in
question make people more secure in their property.”
It is thus similar to TT (2.131), where Locke argues
against any interpretation that makes people worse off
than in the state of nature.
The asymmetric interpretation becomes even more
likely when we consider how well it fits with Locke’s
contractualist argument for limited government. The
logic of Lockean contractualism begins with individu-
als in a state of natural freedom restricted only by their
obligations according to natural law. To claim that the
government has the right to oblige its citizens in a par-
ticular way, Locke’s contractualism places the burden
of proof on those who must show why it would have
been rational for individuals to transfer a given free-
dom to the state. In the present case, Locke’s theory
holds that individuals have the right to refuse to aid
others when it would endanger their own preservation
(TT, 2.6). Using physical force against someone who
has already shown a willingness to violate the rights
of others will often involve considerable physical risk
(TT, 2.126). Locke consistently talks about the power
or right to punish rather than the duty to punish.14
Thus, in Locke’s scheme, individuals in the state of
nature would have had a right to refuse to engage in al-
truistic punishment. Within the context of civil society,
people can often fulfill their obligation to preserve oth-
ers via economic assistance without endangering their
own preservation, but in the state of war that exists
when one state punishes another, the preservation of
the lives of soldiers is jeopardized. Because individuals
14 See TT, 2.7–13, 87, 105, 127, 128, 130, 131, and 171.
472
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 Io
w
a 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
  L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
12
 D
ec
 2
01
7 
at
 2
0:
39
:0
1,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
03
05
54
08
08
03
49
American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 4
in the state of nature have the right to refuse to punish
wrongdoers because of the danger to their own lives, it
is reasonable for them to reserve the right to refuse to
fight inwarswhere the preservation of their community
is not threatened.
There is a tension in the fundamental law of nature
arising from the fact that maximizing the total number
of lives preserved and protecting each individual’s right
to seek his own preservation can conflict. Consider a
soldier commanded to serve in a dangerous combat po-
sition in the Somalia peacekeeping operation in 1993.
His own preservation is threatened by this assignment,
but he may help thousands of people receive needed
food.Locke’s argument that theduty topreserveothers
does not hold when one’s own preservation is threat-
ened implies the primacy of the right to preserve one-
self over the maximization of lives preserved. Because
the individual had the right to refuse to risk his life
to save the lives of others in the state of nature, and
it is not in his material interest to give up this right
when entering political society, Locke assumes that he
retains this right. This argument is compatible with the
state’s use of an army of volunteers who agree to serve
in altruistic wars, but that does not undercut the thesis
under consideration because our concern is with the
state’s use of its coercive power.15
A different way of posing the question is to ask
whether Locke’s lists of the purposes of government
in the Second Treatise are meant to be restrictive or
illustrative. If they are meant to be restrictive then
Locke’s consistent omission of international obliga-
tions is significant; however, if the lists are only il-
lustrative, then the fact that altruistic punishment is
omitted would only mean that such cases were not his
main point. The asymmetry thesis goes along with a
restrictive understanding. Roughly speaking, accord-
ing to the contractualist interpretation of Locke, states
have a limited purpose: to use the collective force of the
community in defense of the life, liberty, and property
of that community within the bounds of natural law.
This, and this only, is the end for which individuals join
political communities. Governments are constrained
both by the negative prohibitions of natural law and
also by the requirement to act only for the public good,
that is, the good of that community with respect to its
worldly interests. When Locke says that governments
exist only to promote the public good, these are the
goals he has in mind. All other freedoms are assumed
to be retained by the individual.
Locke’s grammar in the Second Treatise supports the
restrictive understanding.16 Locke’s writings on reli-
gious toleration provide further confirmation because
the whole point of Locke’s toleration arguments from
1667 on was to establish a restrictive understanding of
the powers of the state. Although Locke had several
lines of argument that converged at this conclusion, it is
15 Ward (2006, 703–4)mentions inpassing thepossibility thatLocke’s
argument might require an all-volunteer army in cases like this, but
then prefers the standard interpretation.
16 See TT, 2.88, 129, and 171, quoted previously, as well as 2.130 and
131.
interesting to note that the contractualist understand-
ing spans from his earliest defense of toleration to his
last. In 1667, more than a decade before he wrote the
Two Treatises, he wrote in the unpublished Essay on
Toleration that “the whole trust, power, and authority
of the magistrate is vested in him for no other purpose
but to be made use of for the good, preservation, and
peace of men in that society over which he is set”
(PE, 135).17 Here, we see the same use of restrictive
language coupled with a limitation of the use of that
power for one’s own society. After briskly setting aside
arguments based on divine right, Locke provided this
rationale: “it cannot be supposed the people should
give any one or more of their fellow men an authority
over them for any other purpose than their own preser-
vation, or extend the limits of their jurisdiction beyond
the limits of this life” (PE, 136). Locke goes so far as to
say that avoiding violence “is the only reason” a man
joins the commonwealth (PE, 149) and that, therefore,
assuming governments can pursue other goals is ille-
gitimate.
Locke made similar arguments after the Two Trea-
tiseswerepublished. In theSecond Letter on Toleration,
Locke described nations in the West Indies “which
have no other end of their society, but their mutual
defense against their common enemies” and whose
prince has no “authority over any of the society” in
time of peace. Under such circumstances, the prince
has no special jurisdiction even to redress wrongs that
the citizens commit against each other (W, 6:121–22).
Defending this example in the Third Letter, he asks
whether in such a society the chieftain “had any power
to use the force of the commonwealth to any other end
but the defense of it against an enemy, though other
benefits were attainable by it?” (W, 6:225). If Locke
in this case claims that the prince or chief of such
a nation had no right to use the collective power of
the people to punish even domestic criminals because
the people had not given him the authority to do so,
it is odd to think that such a prince would have had
authority to mobilize the people for altruistic interna-
tional punishment. If people can give the government
authority to protect them from international but not
domestic threats, surely they can also authorize the
government to protect them from both threats but
not to engage in altruistic punishment. Indeed, one of
Locke’s main arguments in the later letters is that the
mere fact that the state has the ability to bring about
a good is not sufficient to show that it has authority to
bring about that good (W, 6:116–21, 211–20), a princi-
ple of great importance because in cases of altruistic
punishment the ability of the state to bring about a
significant good is often presented as a justificatory
reason.
17 See alsoPE, 141 and 142. There is a passage where Locke says that
the magistrate is only concerned with virtue and vice so far as affects
“the good and preservation of mankind,” but he is clearly referring
to laws being passed that govern the magistrate’s own society (PE,
144). As in the Two Treatises, the occasional references to mankind
are references to how well-functioning states benefit mankind.
473
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 Io
w
a 
St
at
e 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
  L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
12
 D
ec
 2
01
7 
at
 2
0:
39
:0
1,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
:/
/d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
03
05
54
08
08
03
49
Punishment, Property, and the Limits of Altruism November 2008
SECTION FOUR: CONTRACTUALISM AND
LIBERTARIANISM
The contractualist argument for limited government
has implications that go beyond cases of altruistic inter-
national punishment because it speaks to the purposes
of government in general. One strategy for refuting this
explanation of the asymmetry thesis would be to show
that it implies that Locke was a strict libertarian and
then show evidence that Locke was not in fact a strict
libertarian. It is true that a strict libertarian interpreta-
tion of Locke could also account for the international
asymmetry. If one accepts Nozick’s (1974) interpreta-
tion of Locke where governments exist only to protect
the negative rights of their members, prohibitions on
altruistic punishment are unsurprising. Locke was not,
however, a strict libertarian. He was, at best, a lax one.
For purposes of this discussion, strict libertarians hold
that individuals in the state of nature have no positive
obligations to help others, only duties to avoid injury.
Strict libertarianswould insist that government policies
be narrowly tailored to protect individuals against as-
sault, theft, and the like. A lax libertarian, in contrast,
only requires that a given policy be indirectly useful
to these goals. To see the practical importance of the
distinction, compare a libertarian principle that says
individual freedom may only be restricted when that
individual directly harms another person with a princi-
ple that says any act that indirectly harms others may
be prohibited.
On Nozick’s strict libertarian interpretation of
Locke, negative rights function as side constraints on
government action and are not overridden simply by
showing that there will be a net benefit for all affected.
Nor can policies be justified by showing that they will
minimize the number of violations of peoples’ rights
(a kind of “utilitarianism of rights” as Nozick [1974,
30] puts it) because this also fails to treat rights as side
constraints and allows us to intentionally deprive one
person of rights for the sake of others (1974, 28–35).
Libertarian approaches to Locke argue that no one
would be willing to grant society the power to take any
of his preexisting property except what is necessary
for the defense of that property (Epstein 1985, 3–18;
Nozick 1974, 3–25).18 If we apply the same logic to
international punishment, since people in the state of
nature have only an imperfect obligation to fight to
preserve others, they can only be understood to agree
to fight for the protection of themselves and their prop-
erty. They have no need to give up the liberty of decid-
ing when and how to fulfill their imperfect obligation
to preserve foreigners.
Locke’s Third Letter on Toleration contains an inter-
esting example of this style of argument:
The end of a commonwealth constituted can be supposed
no other thanwhatmen in the constitution of, and entering
into it, proposed; and that could be nothing but protection
18 Macpherson’s account (1962) is on this point similar to Nozick’s,
except without the cheers of approval. Both see Locke justifying
virtually unlimited individual appropriation of property.
from such injuries from other men, which they desiring
to avoid, nothing but force could prevent or remedy; all
things but this being as well attainable by men living in
neighborhood without the bounds of a commonwealth,
they could propose to them selves no other thing but this
in quitting their natural liberty, and putting themselves
under the umpirage of a civil sovereign, who therefore
had the force of all themembers of the commonwealth put
into his hands to make his decrees to this end be obeyed.
(W, 6:212)
Locke here repeats the restrictive contractualist ac-
count thatwas noted several times in SectionThree and
uses it to argue that the only purpose of government
is to protect citizens from injuries, an argument a strict
libertarian would applaud.
There are, however, at least two important prob-
lems with positing a strict libertarian interpretation of
Locke as an explanation for the international asym-
metry. The first is that it fails to account for rights of
charity. That Locke believed individuals had obliga-
tions of charity in the state of nature and with respect
to fellow citizens is accepted by most Locke scholars.19
Simmons gives the most thorough treatment of charity
(1992, 307–54), and his account supports the argument
advanced previously about international punishment,
even though Simmons himself, in another section,
follows the standard interpretation of Locke accord-
ing to which altruistic punishment by states is permi-
ssible.20
Locke, according to Simmons, believes that we have
an enforceable duty of charity. The right to charity is
qualified in that those who receive it may be forced to
work if they are able, it applies only to those in extreme
want, and it is only a right to the surplus (luxuries
and unused wealth) of the rich (1992, 329–30). Locke
clearly articulates this principle in the First Treatise
(1.42) and mentions charity (TT, 2.5) and a duty to
preserve others (TT, 2.6) in the Second Treatise. It is
reaffirmed in his writings about reform of the poor
laws. Although Locke set strict work requirements for
receiving assistance, he also made it a punishable of-
fense to allow a person to die from deprivation (PE,
198). Locke’s statement that the magistrate may ban
giving alms in the Essay on Toleration is likely part of
his affirmation of a scheme like the one Locke later
supported for the poor, where begging is prohibited
but the deserving poor are provided for by the state.
Locke’s classification of “uncharitableness” as a sin
but not a crime can be explained by the fact that in
The Letter, charity is used more broadly than cases
of extreme need (Simmons, 1992, 343–44). Simmons
is likely correct that Locke regarded charity as an en-
forceable duty both in the state of nature and in the
state.
Simmons then writes, “While Locke never explic-
itly denies there are international duties of relief, his
tone certainly does not encourage one to believe that
19 See Tully 1980, 131–2; Sreenivasan 1995, 41–47; Waldron 1988, 39,
145–46.
20 See note 6.
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he considered them very seriously.” He then notes
that although the needy in other countries might have
valid claims, governments were not created to pro-
tect the subsistence rights of foreigners (1992, 334).
Simmons explains this discrepancy by claiming that
in Locke’s scheme, duties of charity are strongest in
those cases where we are “specially placed” to give
assistance. Locke allows us to put our own preserva-
tion before others, the preservation of our families
before the preservation of strangers, and the preser-
vation of our fellow citizens before the preservation of
persons abroad (Simmons 1992, 341–52).21 We have
already seen that Pufendorf made a similar argu-
ment concerning when international punishment was
legitimate.
One text that might be used against Simmons’ con-
clusion is Locke’s 1695 journal entry “Venditio.” Locke
states that if a merchant sells food in a famine at a
price so high that people starve, he “offends against
the common rule of charity as a man and if they per-
ish any of them by reason of his extortion [he] is no
doubt guilty of murder” (PE, 342). Because one of
the examples involves ships meeting on the high seas
and another international trade, it appears that “Ven-
ditio’s” principles hold in international contexts, and
there can be a moral obligation to preserve citizens of
other states. This text is not, however, a serious obstacle
for Simmons because it does not undermine his claim
about whether states can enforce international charity
and the examples in “Venditio” are compatible with
the claim that this duty was in practice trivial.
Simmons’ account of Locke’s views on charity shows
an important sense in which Locke was not a libertar-
ian, his belief that individuals have positive and en-
forceable obligations to help others both in the state
of nature and within civil society. Simmons’ interpreta-
tion can also be harmonized with the contractualist ac-
count presented in Section Three. His account accepts
that Locke did not see governments as instruments for
pursuing altruistic purposes internationally as does the
contractualist account. His account also supports the
idea that governments exist to protect the rights of their
own citizens and presents possible reasons why Locke
might have believed that this was compatible with the
preservation of mankind as a whole. The contractual-
ist account in Section Three claims that governments
exist to protect their own citizens within the bounds
of natural law. Simmons’ account of charity shows that
Lockean natural law does not impose any serious pos-
itive obligations on states.
It should also be kept in mind that even if strong
international charity obligations did exist, it would not
imply that states can engage in altruistic punishment.
There is a significant difference between the two cases.
Locke’s account of the state of nature supports duties
of charity and affirms that this right holds only when it
would not threaten the survival of the person or group
21 Locke wrote, in the national context, that “common charity
teaches, that those should be most taken care of by the law, who
are least capable of taking care for themselves” (W, 5:11). He makes
no similar statements about those living abroad.
providing it. In cases of altruistic punishment, lives are
normally put at risk, and Locke explicitly affirms the
right to put one’s own preservation first. Thus, although
the claims about international punishment would hold
even if Locke did affirm enforceable rights of inter-
national charity, Simmons’ claim that Locke regarded
such duties as trivial supports the contractualist ac-
count of the asymmetry thesis, but not the claim that
Locke was a strict libertarian.
The second problem for a strict libertarian interpre-
tation of Locke is that he was happy to argue for gov-
ernment programs that a strict libertarian would find
illegitimate. One of the clearest statements of Locke’s
contractualist criteria for legitimate government policy
comes in the Letter Concerning Toleration:
the pravity of Mankind . . .obliges Men to enter into Soci-
ety with one another; that by mutual Assistance, and joint
Force, they may secure unto each other their Properties
in the things that contribute to the Comfort and Happi-
ness of this Life; . . .But forasmuch as Men thus entering
into Societies, . . .may nevertheless be deprived of them
[goods], either by the Rapine and Fraud of their Fellow-
Citizens, or by theHostileViolence of Foreigners; the rem-
edy of this Evil consists in Arms, Riches, and Multitude of
Citizens; the Remedy of the other in Laws. . . . (L, 47–48)
Notice that governments may legitimately pursue mil-
itary power, wealth, and a large population because
these will help the country to deter foreign attacks and
defend itself in the event of war. Locke’s lax libertari-
anism comes out in that any policy that can be expected
to produce economic growth is presumed justified be-
cause a strong economy helps national security.
Locke’s libertarianism is lax in part because of the
international dimension of his thought. Even if Locke
did not see international relations as a war of all against
all, he did see foreign conquest as a significant threat.
Locke said that conquest is the “usual, and almost
only way” that political societies are dissolved and
that “conquerors swords often cut up governments by
the roots.” “The World,” he continues, “is too well
instructed in, and too forward to allow of this way
of dissolving Governments to need any more to be
said of it” (TT, 2.211).22 In the context of Locke’s life,
there is ample evidence that he was wary of a French
invasion, particularly the possibility that Charles II was
conspiringwith theFrench to returnEngland toRoman
Catholicism (Ashcraft 1986, 17).
Confirmation for this is found in Locke’s other writ-
ings, where he suggests many laws that would deprive
individuals of property but would make society as a
whole better off. His journals suggest that he was in-
terested in government policies to increase population
growth and economic growth that would make a strict
libertarian cringe. In his journal entries on “Atlantis,”
22 Interestingly, on this point, Straussian interpretations of Locke
support the contractualist interpretation. Cox (1960, 164–75) uses
similar passages as evidence for the Hobbesian interpretation of
Locke. See also Coby 1987, 19–22, and Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999,
153–57. For Strauss’ original interpretation of Locke, see Strauss
1953.
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probably either musings on a utopia or possible re-
forms in the Carolina colony, Locke proposed, as an
alternative to sumptuary laws, making it impossible for
those who own land to enter into enforceable debt
contracts so that such men (men who have great in-
fluence over fashion) would not spend beyond their
means (PE, 255). Everyone would be required to know
a useful trade and labor at it at least six hours per week
(PE, 253). Because a “multitude of strong and healthy
people bring the riches of every country,” men who
neither marry nor have children (ironically, men like
Locke himself) are to be considered minors until they
turn 40 and lose their birthright if there is a younger
married sibling (PE, 255).Amanwhomarries awoman
more than five years older than himself forfeits half
of the property she brings to the marriage (PE, 256).
Men who marry before the age of 21 may not “sell,
mortgage, or alienate, or lease, for any longer term
than seven years any land he has any time during his
life, but it shall be all looked upon as the freehold of
his children amongst whom it shall be equally divided
after his death” (PE, 258). In the published report on
reform of the poor laws, the first recommendation for
putting the poor to work is “the suppressing of super-
fluous brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses” (PE,
184). These passages make it hard to read Locke as
a strict libertarian given his willingness to allow the
government to meddle with freedom of contract for
the sake of the public good. Atlantis is a far cry from
the “ultraminimal state” of Nozick. Locke seems in-
stead to be a lax libertarian who departs from even
lax orthodoxy in seeing charity obligations as at least
sometimes enforceable.
The contractualist explanation of the asymmetry
thesis helps us understand what is otherwise puzzling
about Locke’s theory of property and sheds light on the
debate between Tully and his critics (Tully 1993, 118–
36) on Locke’s theory of property. At first, it is hard
to square Locke’s libertarian sounding passages about
governments existing only to protect from injury with
other passages where Locke clearly seems to give gov-
ernments great latitude in pursuing the public good, as
Tully argues. According to the asymmetry thesis, peo-
ple give the government the limited power of protect-
ing the lives, liberties, and properties of the members
of that community, but not the power to act for other
purposes, as in the case of altruistic punishment. Locke
was, however, quite lax in interpreting this requirement
in cases where a policy would help population growth,
economic growth, or any other end that might be indi-
rectly useful to warding off foreign attack, and thus, in
practice, governments would have significant latitude
in regulating property for the common good.23 Char-
ity is not mentioned as a goal of government because
throughout it functions as a constraint on goals rather
than as a goal in its own right.
23 Aschcraft (1986, 103–4, 222, 280) notes Locke’s enthusiasm for
trade. On the argument advanced here, it is not enough to show that
trade is beneficial. One must also show its instrumental relationship
to the preservation of the community.
SECTION FIVE: EVALUATION AND
CONCLUSION
If the interpretation advanced here is correct, it means
there are important asymmetries in Locke’s theory be-
tween the state of nature among individuals and the
state of nature among states. In the state of nature,
all individuals are part of the same society and thus
have the right to punish any violation of natural law
of which they are aware. In international relations,
states have a more constrained power. They have been
given the executive power of the law of nature by cit-
izens, but they are only allowed to use that power for
the end for which the citizens gave it up, namely, the
protection of their property, broadly construed. In the
state of nature, an individual who decides to engage
in altruistic punishment puts only his own life at risk.
Governments, because they have a delegated power,
do not have this liberty. This asymmetry explains why
Locke consistently says that governments exist to pro-
tect the interests of their citizens, but not to help those
citizens better fulfill their duty to preserve the rest of
mankind.
Locke’s argument is not so much about the prohibi-
tion of certain foreign policies as it is about the general
purposes for which governments exist. A state could
still use its money to provide other nations with hu-
manitarian aid, and it could still wage wars to protect
the rights of those living abroad if these actions were
likely to be beneficial to the state performing them.
Locke’s position is not a doctrinaire isolationism any
more than it is a doctrinaire libertarianism. Although
Locke’s position limits the ability of a state to pursue
global economic equality at the expense of its own
economic and military strength, it does not prohibit
such strategies if a state believes that greater global
economic equality will serve its interests. The one place
where it seems that states might have a positive obliga-
tion to act altruistically, providing for subsistence needs
out of surplus wealth, is presented as a limit on the
normal pursuits of government, not a primary purpose
of government.
Buchanan (1999) offers several criticisms of this
Lockean position. He states that Lockean theories af-
firm universal rights, but then only enforce them lo-
cally; the Lockean theory affirms negative duties to
not harm other states, and therefore has trouble justi-
fying a prohibition on acting on positive duties toward
other states. Whatever characteristics human have that
make them improper recipients of intentional harm
surely also make them proper recipients of benefits
(79–81). Buchanan argues that we should see states not
as instruments for the benefit of their own members,
but instead as entities that exist to promote justice both
locally and internationally (83). One potential problem
forBuchanan’s view is that positive international duties
are potentially incredibly burdensome (Murphy 2000).
To address this, Buchanan includes an excessive cost
proviso. He writes, “If we live in a powerful and rich
state, there will surely be cases in which our collective
resources can be used to further the cause of justice in
the world, without excessive cost to us” (1999, 85).
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Some of these criticisms of Locke find echoes in
the following criticisms of Locke; yet, in at least one
important respect, Buchanan ends up committing a
different version of Locke’s mistake, “equivocation on
the body.” A root principle of liberalism is protection
of the body. The moral right of an individual to have
his or her body secured from physical attack or unjust
deprivation of liberty is the basis for many of the legal
rights associated with liberalism. Locke uses the word
“body” more than 80 times in the Second Treatise. On
the one hand, each individual is the owner (or steward)
of his own body (TT, 2.27), and Locke repeatedly uses
phrases like “no body,” “any body,” and “every body”
to refer to collections of individuals. On the other hand,
the political community is repeatedly described as a
body (TT, preface, 2.14, 87, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 118, 145,
168, 188, 205, 208, 211, 212, 219, 242). For any given
individual, there is a possible tension among the preser-
vation of one’s own body, the preservation of another’s
body, and thepreservationof the “body”of thepolitical
community of which one is a part. The tension arises
because Locke is selective in when he wants to think
of the commonwealth as a single body and when he
wants to think of it as a collection of individual bodies.
He is willing to call the commonwealth a “body” that
must move “that way whither the greater force carries
it” when defending the principle of majority rule (TT,
2.96), but when a state engages in unjust foreign ag-
gression, guilt does not fall on the whole body politic,
but only on the individual bodies that supported the
aggression (TT, 2.179).24 The political community is
one body when its own preservation is at stake in that
it can sacrifice the individual bodies of its citizens to
preserve the whole, but when it is only the individual
bodies of people abroad that are at risk, the right to
refuse to protect others when one’s own preservation
is at stake is applied to individual soldiers, not the po-
litical community as a whole. In other words, Locke’s
liberalism provides both a rationale for giving priority
to the preservation of one’s own body and a convenient
ambiguity about which body is to be preserved.
If the body to be preserved were consistently one
or the other, Locke’s conclusions would be more
amenable to the preservation of persons abroad. If one
ceases to think of each state as a single body, one is
more likely to see the bodies of all human as being in
need of protection. Thinking of states as single entities
can distract us from the harms inflicted on the bodies of
individuals within them. However, if political commu-
nities, once formed, were the only relevant bodies, then
states could only refuse to protect other states in cases
where the preservation of the state would be at risk,
a much higher threshold than whether there would be
a risk to the bodies of individual soldiers and possibly
civilians as well.
Buchanan makes a similar mistake going the oppo-
site direction. He criticizes Locke for allowing states to
be indifferent to the suffering of the individual bodies
in other territories; yet, when he justifies humanitarian
24 On Locke’s use of the body metaphor for majority rule as related
to his theory of consent, see Waldron 1999, 129–50.
intervention by saying that for a powerful state inter-
vention will not involve excessive costs, the state is a
single body, and the death of a few hundred soldiers is
but a paper cut. The dying soldier might assess the
magnitude of the cost differently. Buchanan’s argu-
ments are strong as a defense of economic aid, but
with respect to military interventions they beg what
Locke would have seen as the important question. If
individuals in the state of naturemay reasonably refuse
to risk their lives to enforce natural law, may they not
refuse to give the government the right to put their lives
at risk where their own security is not threatened?
This leads us to a second potential problem with
Locke’s argument, and one that gets closer to the heart
of the matter. Perhaps the problem with Locke’s ar-
gument is that the refusal to require self-sacrifice for
a greater number of other people represents too great
a concession to selfishness and individualism. If one
takes seriously the principle of the preservation of hu-
man life, one must choose between two different in-
terpretations of that principle. Locke’s theory presents
a version of the right to self-preservation, where any
action that requires an individual to risk his ownpreser-
vation must be justified on the basis of an agreement
that personmade that, at the time, could rationally have
been understood to promote his preservation. Agree-
ing to unite with others for the common defense of
each other meets this criterion, while joining together
to fight for others far away does not. There is a second
interpretation of this principle that is rule consequen-
tialist, where one simply asks what understanding of
rights and duties will preserve as many human lives
as possible. Buchanan’s way of making this point is to
claim that the values that support a duty not to kill
others likely also support positive duties (1999, 80–81).
One could try to use the consequentialist interpre-
tation and still uphold Locke’s distinction. One might
forbid altruistic intervention because it will likely have
bad consequences, for example, that it will be used by
nations for self-serving reasons and lead to unnecessary
loss of life. One might, therefore, think that protect-
ing soldiers from losing their lives fighting in altruistic
conflicts by banning wars based on that justification
does not conflict with the goal of protecting human life
overall. Unfortunately, this argument is weak as a de-
fense of Locke’s position. First, it does not actually rule
out the cases where humanitarian arguments are most
likely to be used speciously—cases where it is claimed
that war in the national interest also happens to be
justified on humanitarian grounds. Second, it is hard
to imagine that no rule could specify conditions un-
der which sacrifice for other states would generally be
beneficial. One might claim, for example, that the obli-
gation to preserve the lives of others does not cease
in cases where one’s own preservation is threatened,
at least where the number of lives saved exceeds the
number of lives lost. Because the desire to preserve
one’s own life is so strong, we might regard it as a
factor significantly mitigating blame when individuals
fail to sacrifice their lives to save others, but it would not
prevent states from passing laws to force people to live
up to their obligations. People whowould not normally
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risk their lives to save 10 others may be willing to do so
if the alternative is years in jail. Thus, rule consequen-
tialist reasoning leads to a different interpretation of
the preservation principle than Locke’s.
Finally, although Macpherson’s claims that Locke
was an apologist for unlimited individual accumula-
tion of property were exaggerated, Locke does on
the account presented here emerge as something of
an apologist for nearly unlimited state appropriation.
If we shift our concerns about global inequality from
individuals to states, Locke’s theory encourages states
to amass as much wealth as they can in order to pro-
tect themselves from attack and, in the process, may
render obligations of international charity trivial. To
avoid this conclusion, one could attack Locke’s notion
of what counts as “injury.” Locke did not see economic
inequality as, in itself, an injury.However, if global capi-
talism has not left “enough and as good” for theworld’s
poor, this could count as an injury requiring wealthy
states to pay reparations (Pogge 2002, 137–39, 202–3).
Although Locke does not appear to have applied the
“enough and as good” requirement as strictly as this in
the domestic case, one can argue that he should have
(Sreenivasan 1995, 113–17).
The final significance of Locke’s asymmetry is not
so much in the specific actions it prohibits as in the
general sensibility toward collective altruism that it
promotes. Practically speaking, states do not engage
in purely altruistic actions frequently anyway, so ob-
serving Locke’s restriction would not greatly alter their
behavior. The significance of Locke’s argument comes
from how easily and, often imperceptibly, he could
move back and forth between a universal argument for
the preservation of all human and repeated statements
that commonwealths exist to promote the interests and
protect the rights of their own citizens. Although the-
ories of natural rights (and their current human rights
analogs) encourage liberal citizens to see people every-
where as entitled to various things, Lockean contrac-
tualism encourages them to view their particular gov-
ernment primarily as an instrument for protecting their
own rights, not for better fulfilling their duties to pre-
servemankind asmuch as possible. It is not uncommon
for critics of liberalism to point to the gap between the
universal claims of liberal rights and the self-interested
behavior of liberal states. Although the causes of this
gap are diverse, it is plausible to suggest that some
of it may stem from patterns of thought encouraged
by arguably the most practically influential member
of the liberal canon, John Locke. His understanding
of the social contract makes precisely this move from
universal claims about the preservation ofmankind to a
more narrow understanding of governments as agents
for their own citizens.
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